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VALUE OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE PROVIDED BY PHYSICIANS AT AN 
ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTER IN 2007-2008 USING AN OPPORTUNITY COST 
MODEL 
Simon E Laganiere (Sponsored by David Leffell, MD) Department of Dermatology, Yale 
University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT  
 
This project was aimed at defining, quantifying and analyzing the value of 
uncompensated care provided by physicians as part of the Yale Medical Group for the 
2008 fiscal year. Using an opportunity cost model, uncompensated care was calculated 
for each department as a total of bad debt and free care and then compared to existing 
estimates of such care. Another aim of this study was to conduct an interdepartmental 
comparison of the value of such care as a percentage of departmental earnings. To 
undertake this study, a literature search was performed to determine previous estimates 
and models of uncompensated care by physicians. Primary financial data (including 
charges, payments and write-offs for Bad Debt and Free Care) from the Yale Medical 
Group for fiscal year 2008 was then collected, fed into the opportunity cost model and 
compared to published estimates. The results of this study showed that, as a whole, 
physicians at the Yale Medical Group provided $6,510,373.65 of Uncompensated Care (or 
2.75% of Total Payments) with a departmental range of 0.57%-15.29% of Total 
payments.   These results show that Faculty physicians at Yale provided a larger amount 
of Uncompensated care than the published estimates obtained from random sampling of 
almost 4000 physicians. The results also reveal large differences in levels of 
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Definition of the Academic medical center (AMC)/ Academic Health Center 
(AHC) 
Academic medical centers, by virtue of complex and evolving organization structures, 
are historically somewhat difficult to define and as Blumenthal et al. state in their report for the 
Commonwealth Fund: “definitions of an academic health center vary”1. In their attempts to 
characterize and trend the changes in AMCs over time, the Commonwealth Task Force used the 
following working assumption: “AHCs consist of allopathic U.S. medical schools and their closely 
affiliated or owned educational and clinical institutions. In many cases, AHCs also include other 
health professional schools (public health, nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, allied health 
professions)”1. Another definition used in the Journal Academic Medicine defines the AHC as: 
“the formal and informal interrelationships between a medical school's clinical practice, 
educational programs, research activities, and associated teaching hospitals”2
 
. 
The exact interplay of financial and legal responsibilities and liabilities that govern the 
AMC’s organizational framework are beyond the scope of this introduction but it is important to 
note that the many different models exert a set of incentives and pressures on each institution. 
That being said, there are a set of commonalities to AMCs that, in effect, create environments 
that respond to external forces in similar ways. 
 
In fact, as stated in the Journal of Academic Medicine in 2008: “The organizational 
structures of academic health centers (AHCs) vary widely, but they all exist along a continuum of 
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integration-that is, the degree to which the academic and clinical missions operate under a 
single administrative and governance structure.”2   In The Academic Health Center: Evolving 
Organizational Models, Wartman states that “AHCs generally fall somewhere between two 
extremes. At one extreme is a model of full organizational integration where the collective 
components of the AHC are led by a single CEO and a common overarching governing board. At 
the other extreme is a more loosely affiliated model in which the university academic activities, 
medical school physician practices, and teaching hospital operations are each managed by 
different leaders and governed by distinct and independent boards.”2  
   
History of AMC     
 A distinct unifying feature of these large integrated medical centers is that they have a 
“combination of missions that include medical education and training, basic and applied 
research on new medical practices and technologies, and the delivery of state-of-the-art and 
technologically advanced patient care. For many AHCs, their mission also includes the provision 
of care to the poor and uninsured.”1  The requirement to fulfill many simultaneous goals with 
limited resources sets up a tension between these varied missions. And as AHCs evolve and 
respond to external pressures, one should, in fact, expect a requisite change in the approach to 
each historic mission.   
 
Mechanisms of Support 
 
Blumenthal et al. describe the financial support mechanism of AHCs as follows: “In the 
past, society has relied on a complex mixture of public and private mechanisms to support the 
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mission-related expenses of AHCs. Public support has taken the form of explicit payments to 
fund biomedical research (from the National Institutes of Health and other sources), some 
educational expenses (from direct graduate medical education payments under Medicare and 
federal and state grants to support primary care and other training), and some indigent care 
costs (from the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital program, local subsidies, and 
Medicare). Other governmental support has taken the form of add-ons to Medicare and 
Medicaid payments (from indirect medical education at federal and state levels and the 
Medicare disproportionate share hospital program). Private support has for the most part taken 
the form of the higher prices charged private payers by AHCs; it sometimes takes the form of 
charitable contributions to AHCs from individuals or private foundations.”1 
 
As competition for limited resources increases, it would seem perhaps obvious that the 
most fragile or expendable AHC-related mission is the provision of care to the medically 
indigent. Since it constitutes a financial burden that is often cross-subsidized by funds generated 
by other mission-related activities (clinical and research endeavors), caring for the poor at AHCs 
is continuously in jeopardy. In fact, The Commonwealth Task Force states that “As we begin the 
new millennium, the mission of charity care is facing formidable challenges. Health care 
competition is reducing hospital revenues, threatening the availability of the cross-subsidies that 
support hospitals’ social missions, including indigent care”3.  However, as the following will 
demonstrate, this specific mission has served not only a vital historic role but remains of great 
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Short History of Healthcare for the Medically Indigent 
 
 “The mission of providing care to the poor goes back over 200 years to the 
establishment of the first teaching hospitals and medical schools in America. In 1769, Dr. Samuel 
Bard gave the commencement speech to the first graduating class of Kings College Medical 
School in New York City. Urging the establishment of a hospital, Dr. Bard laid out what he 
believed should be the missions of this new organization—patient care, research, and teaching. 
In describing the patient care mission, he said, “Let those who are at once the Victims, both of 
Poverty and Disease, claim your particular attention.”3As Blumenthal et al recount: “Rich and 
middle class patients were treated in their homes. Hospitals were to be avoided. Only the poor 
were left to be treated in institutions, and to provide the raw material for medical education 




During the twentieth century, “both the role of hospitals and the financing of care went 
through major changes. Improvements in technology brought both middle and upper class 
patients into hospitals. Hospitals were no longer sources of care of last resort. The emergence of 
the health insurance industry revolutionized the financing of these institutions and the financing 
of care provided to the poor.”3 Specifically, “the 1965 legislation that established the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs provided the opportunity for faculty to bill federal and state 
governments for their professional services to the elderly and the poor.”4 No longer solely 
dependent on charitable giving, “AHCs and other hospitals began financing charity care through 
cross-subsidies from paying patients. Local governments used tax revenues to provide additional 
support to public hospitals”4. 
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 Historically, charity care to the poor served another important function in that poor 
patients provided educational opportunities for the training of medical students. “Many medical 
schools formed loose affiliations with clinical faculty to meet the educational needs of both 
students and trainees, often through the provision of unreimbursed care to the poor and elderly 
in their associated hospitals. Until the mid-1960s, the faculty’s patient care services for these 
populations went unreimbursed.”4 As medical training and the medical insurance industry have 
evolved, however, this important historic agreement has not continued to play as significant a 
role. Combined with increasing financial pressures, the lack of direct tradeoff has further 
jeopardized the fulfillment of this important function.  
 
Current changes and evolution with new pressures  
In the Sept 6th 2000 article in JAMA entitled “Academic Medicine’s Financial 
Accountability and Responsibility, Reinhardt describes the evolution of AMC-related missions. 
He states: “Indeed, it can be argued that the leaders of academic medicine continue to be 
victims of an utterly confused US public that simply cannot decide what the social role of health 
care should be in this country. From academic medicine, that confused public now demands the 
impossible, namely, that academic medicine pursue its traditional, altruistic mission of providing 
cutting-edge patient care, performing world-class basic and clinical research, and educating the 
physicians of the future after having been thrust into a harsh, price-competitive marketplace. 
Academic medicine is expected to play nicely in an environment where nice folks finish last”5
 
. 
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In fact, multiple marketplace pressures have come to bear on AMCs simultaneously. In 
the Academic Medicine article The Evolving Organizational Structure of Academic Health 
Centers: The Case of the University of Florida, Barrett describes them as the following1:  
 
1. Decreases in states' general revenues to public medical schools,  
2. Flattening of the National Institutes of Health budget supporting research at medical 
schools, 
3. Reductions in reimbursement for physicians' clinical services 
4. Growth in #of underinsured/uninsured 
 
(To this list we could also add): 
  5. Disproportionate increase in AMC burden 
 
The last three of these factors merit closer attention and support for these claims is presented 
in the following subsections.    
 
Reductions in reimbursement for academic physician’s clinical services 
 
In the August 2006 Academic Medicine article The Impact of the Lack of Health 
Insurance: How Should Academic Medical Centers and Medical Schools Respond?, Coleman 
states that “Faculty in clinical departments typically face very high practice costs and are 
reimbursed for clinical services by insurers whose rates have not kept pace with inflation in the 
cost of health care. He states that “the margins of clinical practice in medical schools and AMCs 
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are increasingly unable to cross-subsidize the care of uninsured patients from the care of 
insured patients. Consequently, individual faculty and clinical departments are under increasing 
pressure to limit care of uninsured patients”6
 
. 
The drop in Medicare payments to FPPs (Faculty-Practice Plans) is due to a combination 
of concomitant issues. “First, beginning in 1991, Medicare implemented the resource-based 
relative value scale (RBRVS) for the physician work component of physician payments. This new 
reimbursement policy resulted in major drops in Medicare payment rates for physician 
specialists. As AHCs tend to have a relatively high density of specialists to support their specialty 
care and educational missions, FPPs faced a decrease in Medicare payments”3.  Medicare has 
also “implemented new rules restricting the circumstances under which teaching physicians may 
bill for services. Thus, while AHC hospitals providing disproportionate amounts of care to the 
poor continue to receive additional support from Medicare and Medicaid, the revenues of FPPs 
from the public plans have been falling”.3 
 
Growth in #of underinsured/uninsured 
 
 As financial pressures mount and supply of possible charity care decreases, the 
concomitant increase in the amount of medically-indigent patients and thus the demand for 
charity services is increasing. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation report on the uninsured 
in America in 2004, “there are nearly 44 million Americans without health insurance coverage… 
and the number of uninsured Americans continues to grow”7. This well documented trend 
continued in the subsequent years. In fact, the number of non-elderly Americans who lack 
health insurance continues to rise by approximately 1 million per year, climbing to 45.6 million 
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in 2005 and 47 million in 20068
   
.When one considers the lack of universal health care or increase 
in even partial insurance coverage, this number is surely expected to continue growing in the 
coming years and to exert even more pressure on the current safety net for the uninsured. 
 Disproportionate increase in AMC burden 
  
As the demand for charitable services is growing, the burden continues to fall 
disproportionally on AMCs and faculty physicians.  Many centers are located in close proximity 
to disadvantaged neighborhoods, are historically tied to the care of the medically indigent and 
are required by law (EMTALA laws of 1986) to screen and treat any unstable patient that enters 
the hospital. AMCs are also often the only tertiary center for patients with specific needs (for 
example burn victims)9
 
.  One small example of this fact is described by Sheffield et al. in their 
description of the mission of the Harborview Medical Center in Seattle WA. “Total revenue [at 
Harborview Medical Center] in 2005 was $506 million and income exceeded expenditures by 
$8.1 million (a 1.6%margin). UWSOM faculty and staff based at Harborview provided $98 million 
in charity care during the year, which accounted for more than one-third of all charity care in 
the state.”9  
Another factor contributing to the burden at AMCs is inter-hospital transfers of 
complicated uninsured inpatients. In The Relationship of Insurance Status, Hospital Ownership, 
and Teaching Status with Inter-hospital Transfers in California in 2000, the authors determined 
that County-owned hospitals and University of California teaching hospitals appear to have 
received more patients whose primary reason for transfer may have been financial than did 
other hospital groups10. 
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Results of Financial Pressures 
The result of these many pressures is a predictable overall integrated focus towards 
sustainability and profitability.  Leadership and administrators (at both the hospital and faculty 
practice plans) are obliged to confront these realities and readjust their priorities. However, 
since Hospitals and Faculty Physicians respond to different pressures and operate in a different 
legal environment, the strategies used to manage these issues differ and have different 
outcomes on the care of the medically indigent. As stated by Dr. Cohen, president of the AAMC 
in 2000, “Many circumstances are coming together to place unprecedented pressure on the 
nation’s health care safety net.’’11
 
      
Compensatory/offsetting strategies for AMCs    
Government subsidies to Hospitals 
Compensation for the treatment of the uninsured is achieved by government subsidies 
to hospitals through its Medicare and Medicaid payments. “Medicaid has two major programs 
that help fund the cost of hospital uncompensated care: DSH payments and supplemental 
payment programs. These programs also offset low Medicaid reimbursement rates in hospitals 
that receive DSH payments. Medicaid DSH payments support both hospitals and long-term care 
facilities that treat large numbers of poor patients. Medicare subsidizes uncompensated care 
through its Medicare DSH payments and indirect medical education (IME) hospital payments. 
Medicare’s DSH adjustment is applied to the payment rate for hospitals that treat a large 
number of poor patients”3.   
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 Limiting access to care, Increasing collections  
Depending on ownership status of the hospital (for-profit, not-for-profit and public), 
certain compensatory strategies have already been adopted.  In Managing the Unmanaged, 
Weiner et al. undertook the analysis of how 3 urban medical centers with differing ownership 
models, within 1 metropolitan area, ration access to uncompensated care to uninsured patients. 
They found that the public institution “provided the broadest access to the largest percentage of 
self-pay patients but offset the burden with the most successful prepayment and collection 
practices. The for-profit site obeyed federal regulations mandating emergency care but severely 
curtailed non-ED services (referring to other institutions), and the not-for-profit limited access 




Compensatory strategies specific to physicians  
Importance of physician’s role in medical center 
The importance of physicians to the care of low-income persons is demonstrated by the 
fact that roughly “one-third of uninsured persons and 58 percent of Medicaid enrollees report 
that a physician’s office is the place where they usually receive medical care, a higher 
percentage than that reported for both health centers and hospital-based facilities (unpublished 




P a g e  | 15 
 
Physicians refuse care for Uninsured and Medicaid  
 
However, “physicians are not legally obligated to care for Medicaid recipients or the 
uninsured, and most doctors limit such care, although the American Medical Association (AMA) 
emphasizes that physicians should render medical services to indigent patients and tend to the 
welfare of the community”8.  
    
Given the importance of physicians as a source of care for low-income uninsured and 
Medicaid enrollees, Cunningham et al. state that “policymakers should be concerned about 
recent trend data from the Community Tracking Study Physician Survey showing that the 
number of physicians providing charity care and accepting Medicaid patients has been 
decreasing since the mid-1990s”13. The percentage of physicians providing any charity care has 
fallen fairly substantially, from 76.3 percent in 1996/1997 to 68.2 percent in 2004/2005. Also, a 
growing number of physicians derive no revenue from Medicaid and are not accepting new 
Medicaid patients, although the change between 1996/1997 and 2004/2005 has not been as 
great as that for physicians’ charity care.  
 
Lack of DSH-type payments to support Physician practices? 
 Given the important role played by physicians (and especially faculty physicians) in the 
provision of care to the medically indigent, it is noteworthy that no direct government subsidy 
directly supports their efforts. As noted by Barrett: “Government programs have subsidized 
hospitals treating a disproportionate amount of poor patients (e.g., the disproportionate share 
hospital payment adjustment and Medicare’s indirect medical education adjustment); however, 
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these programs have not included physicians. Further, emergency physician groups do not have 
other business units or sources of revenue to subsidize high levels of uncompensated care 
costs”2.  
 Blumenthal et al. describe the situation as follows: “Faculty Physician Practices do not 
receive the financial consideration from government for their clinical services that hospitals do. 
AHC hospitals are eligible for significant payment adjustments from Medicare and Medicaid to 
support the cost of their care to the poor and uninsured. Medicare and Medicaid 
disproportionate share policies provide substantial funding for hospitals with an unusually high 
volume of care to poor Medicare and Medicaid patients. Yet, neither public plan offers 
comparable support to physicians and faculty practice plans. In fact, Medicare and Medicaid 
payments for physician services have been falling. On an inflation-adjusted basis, FPP Medicare 
revenues fell by nearly 10 percent (9.8%) from 1995 to 1998; Medicaid patient revenues were 
down 15.2 percent”.3 
 
Adjustments in compensation plans to prioritize financial sustainability 
Academic departments have supported their faculty in clinical, research, and teaching 
areas in the past; nonetheless, due to economic trends in the healthcare environment, this has 
created a challenge to departments based at academic medical centers. In the past, excess 
revenue was used to support teaching and research, however; with the decrease in 
reimbursement and increase in documentation, this is no longer possible. Because of these 
changes, academic healthcare organizations are focusing now, more than ever before, on their 
physician compensation plans as most practices in integrated healthcare systems are having 
difficulty meeting their salaries and overhead”13.  
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According to Rimar in Strategic Planning and the Balanced Scorecard for Faculty Practice Plans 
“strategic planning is critical for faculty practice plans since they are, in many ways, more 
vulnerable to competition than the other components of AHCs. Without financial reserves or 





Financial Incentive structures  
Given the need for sustainable faculty practices, compensation plans now center around 
the benchmarking of clinical performance. Strategies to maximize earnings entail focusing on 
variables such as gross charges, collections, net charges and work relative value units (wRVUs).   
The following provides short definitions. 
 
Gross Charges: Gross charges are a simple reflection of actual practice activities. However, the 
disadvantage is that they do not accurately reflect the actual collections from patients and 
payers. 
 
Collections (Payments): Collections reflect money actually received. Establishing physician 
bonuses, however, on collections can penalize the physicians that service the medically indigent. 
 
Net Charges: Net Charges are gross charges minus contractual adjustments. This method can 
also cause physicians to get more or less credit for their work based on the reimbursement of 
the payers. 
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Work Relative Value Units (wRVUs):. Work RVUs measure the clinical effort of the provider and 
are linked to the current procedural terminology (CPT) codes. Activity can be compared with 
other practices across the country. The advantage of wRVUs is that it does not rely on payer mix, 
collection ratios, or use of laboratories. 13 
 
Results of Overall Strategies 
As faculty plans become more sophisticated at maximizing earnings potential, the 
pressure to curtail non- profitable endeavors such as charity care increases significantly. 
Coleman describes the current situation in Academic Medicine in 2006 as follows:  “Faculty in 
clinical departments typically face very high practice costs and are reimbursed for clinical 
services by insurers whose rates have not kept pace with inflation in the cost of health care. 
Accordingly, the margins of clinical practice in medical schools and AMCs are increasingly unable 
to cross-subsidize the care of uninsured patients from the care of insured patients. 
Consequently, individual faculty and clinical departments are under increasing pressure to limit 
care of uninsured patients.”6 
 
Need to quantify social mission, value of charity care 
 Given the current trends and the impact on charity care, proper accounting and 
trending of the amounts of uncompensated care is important. This is especially true at Academic 
Medical Centers where a significant portion of this care is provided.  In their analysis as part of 
the Task Force for The Commonwealth Fund, Blumenthal et al recommended that “AHCs and 
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public authorities must develop improved information on the content and amounts of mission-
related activities undertaken at AHCs”. Specifically, they recommend that “1-Government at all 
levels should invest in research and development necessary to develop valid and reliable 
measures of performance in mission-related areas and 2- Data on the quantity, quality, and 
productivity of mission-related activities and their associated clinical expenses at institutions 
seeking public support for those expenses should be publicly available.”1  
    
Previous Attempts to Model Free Care (Methods of tabulating/ calculating) 
Several states have enacted laws which define a minimum level of charity care that non-
profit hospitals must provide in order to retain their tax-exempt status. “In Texas, for example, 
hospitals must document that they’re providing charity care equal to 4% of the hospital’s 
patient revenue, excluding bad debt”15
In the preceding decades, although the AMA has performed yearly surveys to calculate 
free and discounted care at hospitals, few studies have actually attempted to calculate the 
“quantity, quality, and productivity” of uncompensated care by physicians15. As stated by Hadley 





. Previous attempts have centered on the use of self-reported surveys 
of patients and physicians.  
 Community-tracking study (Cunningham et al.) 
CTS is a nationally representative telephone survey of physicians involved in direct care 
in the continental U.S. This survey asked physicians about the share of patients who receive free 
or reduced price care due to financial need (but without distinguishing insured versus 
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uninsured), and the percentage of practice time spent providing such care. The most recent 
round of this study (2004–2005) found that 68.2% of physicians provide such “charity care”, and 
that, among physicians providing such care, it amounts to 6.3% of their time17
 
. 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
This approach uses household survey data collected by the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS). MEPS obtains information on services used from household respondents and 
then contacts providers to identify amounts and sources of payment for the respondents’ care. 
  
AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System 
An analysis of data from the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) 1994 
Socioeconomic Monitoring System found that “67.7 percent of physicians provided some 
uncompensated care and that those physicians spent an average of 7.2 hours per week 
delivering that care. Using an estimate (from the same study) of physicians’ average gross 
earnings per hour of $105 and inflating to 2001 prices produces an estimate of $9.1 billion in 
uncompensated care delivered by physicians”15.  
 
Drawbacks to using survey data 
 One important consideration with the use of survey data are the confounders. 
Inherent in self-reported accounting of care is recall bias and a propensity to overestimate 
donated time. Thus, the lack of primary financial data creates difficulty in valuing and trending 
the amount of care actually provided.     
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However, the attempt to use financial data to value physician activities also presents 
challenges.  For example, how does one value a physician’s time and which values should be 
used: net charges, collections or RVUs? Since reimbursements are largely dictated by Medicare, 
Medicaid and the rates negotiated with private insurance companies, no single “value” exists for 
each billable physician activity.  
One result of this differential billing system is in fact the paradoxically higher charges 
faced by non-insured or self-pay patients. In fact, as reported in Medical Fees Are Often Higher 
For Patients Without Insurance, “… the uninsured are outside of the system and have no one to 
negotiate for them. So they end up charged the higher prices”18
Without the support of such entities, self-pay patients as a whole are charged 
substantially higher rates. Even with personally discounted rates including complete write-offs 
(when patients are deemed indigent by virtue of limited resources), self-pay patients as a whole 
generate a significant stream of revenue (even if a significant portion of these self-pay patients 
aren’t able to pay anything).   
. The result of ongoing 
negotiated payments discounts by large insurer groups and government entities results in very 
inflated non-negotiated charges on which they apply the discount.  
 
Valuing free time as Opportunity Costs  
 In the article How much Uncompensated Care do doctor’s provide?, Gruber 
attempted to get at this apparent paradox by valuing physician donated time as the amount 
they were forgoing by seeing an indigent patient instead of a paying patient. They stated that: 
“The magnitude of provider uncompensated care has become an important public policy issue. 
Yet existing measures of uncompensated care are flawed because they compare uninsured 
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payments to list prices, not to the prices actually paid by the insured.”15 In their attempt, they 
used financial data from almost 4000 physicians from all types of practices (private, groups and 
faculty), and measured “uncompensated care as the net amount that physicians lose by lower 
payments from the uninsured than from the insured.”15 
 
This approach “implicitly asks the question: if each provider could replace each 
uninsured patient with an insured patient who received the same level of care, would the 
provider expect to make more or less? If the uninsured patient paid the same amount the 
average insurance company would pay (to the same doctor, for the same procedure), then we 
say there is no uncompensated care.”15  
 
The results from this approach were surprising. Gruber and Rodriguez essentially found 
“that physicians [as a whole] provide negative uncompensated care to the uninsured, earning 
more on uninsured patients than on insured patients with comparable treatments.” 15 
 
These results counter the more commonly held view about physician charity. In their 
article, however, the distribution of charity care was of course not distributed evenly among 
different physicians. While overall physicians were providing limited or negative amounts of 
care in terms of value as opportunity cost, some physicians were providing quite a lot of 
uncompensated care.   
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Where do faculty physicians fall on this spectrum? 
The value of uncompensated care generated by Academic faculty physicians within the 
above distribution is unknown but likely quite high and thus of great interest in quantifying and 
following over time. This is especially true when considering the disproportionately large 
proportion of uncompensated care being provided in AMCs and thus the large potential impact 
of a change in physician behavior regarding uncompensated care.  
Since these values (based on this approach) are largely unknown and/or unpublished in 
academic faculty practices, calculating the data based on the financial data for one fiscal year at 
one academic practice is a reasonable starting point for further comparisons. 
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Statement of purpose specific hypothesis and specific aims of thesis: 
  
 
• To measure the amount of “uncompensated care” provided to 
medically indigent patients by Faculty at an Academic Medical Center in 
terms of an opportunity cost model.   
 
• To determine the value of uncompensated care by department 
  
•  To compare the values obtained in this study to current estimates 

















 Literature search for current understanding and valuation of care provided by academic 
physicians 
 OVID Medline was searched for any article reporting on uncompensated care at academic 
medical centers using the following parameters:   
Results Generated From: 
Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1950 to June Week 1 2009> 
        Ovid MEDLINE(R) <2005 to June Week 1 2009> (updates since 2009-06-01) 
 
 
Set   Search                                                            Results #Articles 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
001   medically uninsured.mp. or exp Medically Uninsured/              1428 
002   medical indigency.mp. or exp Medical Indigency/                112 
003   uncompensated care.mp. or exp Uncompensated Care/                462 
004   self pay.mp.                                                        79 
005   1 or 2 or 3 or 4                                                  1929 
006   exp Faculty, Medical/                                              1530 
007   exp Academic Medical Centers/                                    11246 
008   ((academic or faculty or medical) adj2 (practice or group or  plan)).tw.             3004 
009   8 or 6 or 7                                                        15026 
010   9 and 5                                                               41 
011   reimbursement.mp. or exp Reimbursement, Disproportionate Sha       6845 
      re/ or exp Insurance, Health, Reimbursement/ or exp Reimburs 
      ement Mechanisms/ or exp Reimbursement, Incentive/           
012   11 and 10                                                              5 
013   Health services accessibility.mp. or exp Health Services Acc      15477 
      essibility/                                                  
014   13 and 10                                                              9 
015   exp Schools, Medical/                                               2278 
016   10 and 15                                                              6 
017   exp Physician's Practice Patterns/                                 11175 
018   10 and 17                                                              0 
019   exp Group Practice/ or exp Practice Management/ or exp Pract       5609 
      ice Management, Medical/                                     
020   19 and 10                                                              2 
021   exp Fees, Medical/                                                   299 
022   21 and 10                                                              0 
023   exp Employee Incentive Plans/                                        175 
024   23 and 10                                                              0 
025   physician incentive plan.mp. or exp Physician Incentive Plan        469                                  
                        
026   25 and 10                                                              0 
027   26 or 12 or 20 or 14 or 22 or 18 or 24 or 16                         17 
028   27 or 10                                                              41 
029   Uncompensated Care Provided by.m_titl.                                1 
030   medically uninsured.mp. or exp Medically Uninsured/                1428 
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031   medical indigency.mp. or exp Medical Indigency/                     112 
032   uncompensated care.mp. or exp Uncompensated Care/                   462 
033   self pay.mp.                                                          79 
034   30 or 31 or 32 or 33                                                1929 
035   exp Faculty, Medical/                                               1530 
036   exp Academic Medical Centers/                                      11246 
037   ((academic or faculty or medical) adj2 (practice or group or plan)).tw.                       3004       
038   37 or 35 or 36                                                     15026 
039   38 and 34                                                             41 
040   reimbursement.mp. or exp Reimbursement, Disproportionate Sha       6845 
      re/ or exp Insurance, Health, Reimbursement/ or exp Reimburs 
      ement Mechanisms/ or exp Reimbursement, Incentive/           
041   40 and 39                                                              5 
042   Health services accessibility.mp. or exp Health Services Acc      15477 
      essibility/                                                  
043   42 and 39                                                              9 
044   exp Schools, Medical/                                               2278 
045   39 and 44                                                              6 
046   exp Physician's Practice Patterns/                                 11175 
047   39 and 46                                                              0 
048   exp Group Practice/ or exp Practice Management/ or exp Pract       5609 
      ice Management, Medical/                                     
049   48 and 39                                                              2 
050   exp Fees, Medical/                                                   299 
051   50 and 39                                                              0 
052   exp Employee Incentive Plans/                                        175 
053   52 and 39                                                              0 
054   physician incentive plan.mp. or exp Physician Incentive Plan        469 
055   54 and 39                                                              0 
056   55 or 41 or 49 or 43 or 51 or 47 or 53 or 45                         17 
057   56 or 39                                                             41 
058   exp Physicians/                                                    11899 
059   58 or 38                                                            26181 




Financial Data mining of primary financial data from Yale Medical Group financial 
services 
 The information about uncompensated care at YMG was pulled from Precision Business 
Intelligence (PBI), the business analytical tool utilized to analyze and report data. Data from the 
IDX/GE Centricity financial system is extracted nightly through Global Works.  
BAR is the Billing and Accounts Receivable application that maintains the complete accounting 
of all patient financial activity. The queries were based on transaction level information from 
BAR. 
 
Data for Free Care Write-Offs for FY2008 was sorted by department and includes any invoice 
that had Free Care paycodes listed below, and the total charges, units, and payments posted on 
that invoice. Data for Bad Debt Write-Offs for FY2008 was sorted by department and includes 
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any invoice that had Bad Debt paycodes listed below, and the total charges, units, and payments 





The following paycodes as Free Care and Bad Debt were used to determine the amount of 
uncompensated financial services - 
 
1) Free Care 
 
*         FINANCIAL HARDSHIP DISCOUNT 
*         FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES 
*         MAMO CHARITY DISCOUNT 
*         PHYSICIAN DETERMINED FINANCIAL HARDSHIP 
*         YDR CHARITY WRITEOFF 
*         PROFESSIONAL COURTESY DISCOUNT 
*         ANESTHESIA/SURG RESIDENT COSMETIC DISCOUNT 
*         INTL SVC FREE CARE DISCOUNT 
*         CITY WELFARE NH ADJ 
 
2) Bad Debt 
 
*         BANKRUPTCY 
*         DECEASED PT-NO ESTATE ADJ 
*         PETER ROBERTS AND ASSOC WRITE-OFF 
*         TRANS CONTINENTAL WRITE-OFF 













Approach to calculation of Uncompensated Care  
 
Formula Free Care for each department for each year: 
{(Total payments/total charges ) * total Free Care Charges } – Actual payments from Free Care 
accounts 
Formula Bad debt  for each department for each year: 
{(Total payments/total charges ) * total Bad debt Charges } – Actual payments from Bad Debt 
accounts 
 
Total Uncompensated Care = Free Care + Bad Debt 
 
Example: 
Three patients are each billed 1000$ for the same procedure by a physician under Yale Medical 
Group. The first patient is privately insured and the negotiated rate is 200$, the second has 
Medicare and the rate is 100$ and the third has Medicaid with a rate of 50$. The average rate of 
payment for an insured patient for this procedure is thus (200+100+50/ 3*1000) = 11.6%.  
If a patient is uninsured  and billed 1000$ for the same procedure, they will probably receive a 
discount or simply not pay (or both).  However, the average uninsured patient will pay 
something and  YMG will receive that amount. For example, the average amount received for 
this procedure could be 56$ for uninsured patients. 
The opportunity cost, (assuming an endless supply of insured patient) of seeing an uninsured 
patient instead of an insured patient in this scenario would be {(1000 * 11.6%)}-56$ = 60$. Thus 
there is a 60$ “uncompensated care opportunity cost” for every uninsured individual 































   

















ANESTHESIOLOGY $86,340,161 $30,814,569 $82,465,342 $30,066,959 36.46 
CHILD STUDY 
CENTER $4,067,182 $3,080,599 $3,977,947 $3,055,423 76.81 
DERMATOLOGY $35,155,105 $20,106,339 $34,070,532 $19,713,614 57.86 
DERMATOPATHOL
OGY LAB $813,713 $597,509 $786,327 $584,673 74.36 
DIAGNOSTIC 
RADIOLOGY $45,289,045 $15,915,781 $41,959,718 $15,365,275 36.62 
GENETICS $6,241,977 $2,576,160 $5,964,065 $2,480,663 41.59 
INTERNAL 
MEDICINE $82,627,369 $26,562,646 $77,093,326 $25,505,855 33.08 
LABORATORY 
MEDICINE $2,691,160 $809,028 $2,551,744 $790,562 30.98 
NEUROLOGY $7,050,972 $2,619,401 $6,686,163 $2,547,631 38.10 
NEUROSURGERY $17,060,834 $4,903,132 $16,389,247 $4,738,692 28.91 
OB/GYN $49,603,859 $20,871,263 $47,727,321 $20,353,000 42.64 
OPHTHALMOLOGY $14,270,012 $4,750,649 $13,399,894 $4,546,797 33.93 
ORTHOPAEDICS $28,396,267 $9,760,040 $26,979,111 $9,455,522 35.05 
PATHOLOGY $48,362,457 $23,458,338 $46,417,049 $22,945,207 49.43 
PEDIATRICS $50,471,996 $17,746,371 $48,752,304 $17,240,121 35.36 
PSYCHIATRY $2,707,367 $763,004 $2,303,332 $695,015 30.17 
SURGERY $85,821,866 $28,547,223 $81,432,580 $27,728,397 34.05 
SURGERY 
EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE $28,715,996 $9,620,727 $24,037,206 $9,284,817 38.63 
THERAPEUTIC 
RADIOLOGY $20,794,785 $7,606,242 $20,064,968 $7,493,949 37.35 
YALE CANCER 
CENTER $10,024,286 $5,289,834 $9,379,091 $5,102,379 54.40 
Totals $627,873,637 $236,911,667 $593,778,972 $230,203,788 38.77 
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ANESTHE-SIOLOGY $12,011,917 $1,274,903.45 $82,465,342  $70,453,425  $30,066,959  $28,792,056  36.46 40.87  
CHILD STUDY 
CENTER $2,526,300 $1,944,500.32 $3,977,947  $1,451,647  $3,055,423  $1,110,923  76.81 76.53  
DERMATOLOGY $296,703 $58,522.80 $34,070,532  $33,773,829  $19,713,614  $19,655,091  57.86 58.20  
DERMATOPATH-
OLOGY LAB $5,188 $4,588.41 $786,327  $781,139  $584,673  $580,085  74.36 74.26  
DIAGNOSTIC 
RADIOLOGY $5,958,674 $1,529,988.50 $41,959,718  $36,001,044  $15,365,275  $13,835,287  36.62 38.43  
GENETICS $1,045,202 $236,548.80 $5,964,065  $4,918,863  $2,480,663  $2,244,114  41.59 45.62  
INTERNAL 
MEDICINE $9,735,152 $1,706,899.22 $77,093,326  $67,358,174  $25,505,855  $23,798,956  33.08 35.33  
LABORATORY 
MEDICINE $356,168 $46,512.07 $2,551,744  $2,195,576  $790,562  $744,050  30.98 33.89  
NEUROLOGY $1,060,056 $172,201.67 $6,686,163  $5,626,107  $2,547,631  $2,375,429  38.1 42.22  
NEURO-SURGERY $2,814,390 $327,504.56 $16,389,247  $13,574,857  $4,738,692  $4,411,187  28.91 32.50  
OB/GYN $10,678,841 $2,988,945.78 $47,727,321  $37,048,480  $20,353,000  $17,364,054  42.64 46.87  
OPHTHAL-MOLOGY $2,728,861 $397,534.82 $13,399,894  $10,671,033  $4,546,797  $4,149,262  33.93 38.88  
ORTHOPAEDICS $2,829,343 $393,585.60 $26,979,111  $24,149,768  $9,455,522  $9,061,936  35.05 37.52  
PATHOLOGY $3,153,417 $596,035.50 $46,417,049  $43,263,632  $22,945,207  $22,349,172  49.43 51.66  
PEDIATRICS $21,453,552 $3,978,355.01 $48,752,304  $27,298,752  $17,240,121  $13,261,766  35.36 48.58  
PSYCHIATRY $891,790 $176,454.16 $2,303,332  $1,411,542  $695,015  $518,561  30.17 36.74  
SURGERY $13,614,661 $1,974,710.11 $81,432,580  $67,817,919  $27,728,397  $25,753,687  34.05 37.97  
SURGERY 
EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE $6,744,143 $1,038,933.94 $24,037,206  $17,293,063  $9,284,817  $8,245,883  38.63 47.68  
THERAPEUTIC 
RADIOLOGY $1,135,158 $185,102.24 $20,064,968  $18,929,810  $7,493,949  $7,308,847  37.35 38.61  
YALE CANCER 
CENTER $652,405 $131,764.43 $9,379,091  $8,726,686  $5,102,379  $4,970,615  54.4 56.96  
Totals $100,672,266 $19,546,999 $593,778,972  $493,106,706  $230,203,788  $210,656,789  38.77 42.72  
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Table 3 : Fiscal Year 2008 Uncompensated Care generated from outstanding “Bad 
Debt” Accounts per department 






















LOGY $2,812,016 19,264 $655,642 $1,048,738 $1,025,264 $1,149,181 $369,622 $493,539 
CHILD STUDY 
CENTER $41,855 355 $4,686 $34,077 $32,148 $32,031 $27,462 $27,345 
DERMATOLOGY $731,553 3,106 $345,390 $175,450 $423,285 $425,736 $77,895 $80,346 
DERMATOPATH
OLOGY LAB $24,740 156 $12,143 $9,416 $18,395 $18,372 $6,252 $6,229 
DIAGNOSTIC 
RADIOLOGY $2,323,143 22,982 $528,145 $811,406 $850,714 $892,789 $322,570 $364,645 
GENETICS $252,450 1,155 $92,925 $69,008 $105,003 $115,174 $12,077 $22,249 
INTERNAL 
MEDICINE $3,901,268 14,124 $1,013,076 $1,253,776 $1,290,711 $1,378,394 $277,634 $365,318 
LABORATORY 
MEDICINE $100,902 673 $17,797 $33,200 $31,261 $34,194 $13,464 $16,397 
NEUROLOGY $259,155 2,450 $69,591 $89,629 $98,746 $109,419 $29,154 $39,828 
NEURO-
SURGERY $514,923 695 $131,412 $122,886 $148,882 $167,326 $17,470 $35,914 
OB/GYN $1,600,452 4,438 $480,793 $529,072 $682,502 $750,107 $201,710 $269,315 
OPHTHAL-
MOLOGY $650,897 1,746 $187,499 $192,893 $220,860 $253,091 $33,360 $65,592 
ORTHOPAEDICS $1,073,007 2,522 $295,411 $361,099 $376,063 $402,634 $80,652 $107,223 
PATHOLOGY $1,657,914 10,164 $493,386 $649,253 $819,552 $856,447 $326,166 $363,061 
PEDIATRICS $1,569,402 5,901 $490,260 $551,566 $554,983 $762,417 $64,723 $272,157 
PSYCHIATRY $279,345 1,470 $39,972 $165,982 $84,290 $102,623 $44,319 $62,652 
SURGERY $2,865,354 5,379 $743,358 $1,086,455 $975,674 $1,088,111 $232,316 $344,753 
SURGERY 
EMERGENCY 




RADIOLOGY $413,089 996 $104,176 $102,327 $154,282 $159,495 $50,106 $55,319 
YALE CANCER 
CENTER $472,555 1,710 $175,747 $117,286 $257,078 $269,162 $81,331 $93,415 






Bad Debt Financial Categories include: 
-BANKRUPTCY 
-DECEASED PT-NO ESTATE ADJ 
-PETER ROBERTS AND ASSOC WRITE-OFF 
-TRANS CONTINENTAL WRITE-OFF 
-SMALL BALANCE ADJ 
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Table 4: Fiscal Year 2008 Uncompensated Care generated from outstanding “Free 
Care” Accounts per department 
Department Charges Payments Write-off's 
Expected 
Reimbursem















SIOLOGY $1,062,803 $91,968 $952,263 $387,499.20 $434,333.50 $295,531.41 $342,365.71 
CHILD STUDY 
CENTER $47,380 $20,490 $26,374 $36,392.12 $36,259.17 $15,901.90 $15,768.95 
DERMA-
TOLOGY $353,020 $47,335 $267,016 $204,261.56 $205,444.29 $156,926.70 $158,109.43 
DERMATO-
PATHOLOGY 
LAB $2,646 $692 $1,701 $1,967.43 $1,964.96 $1,275.14 $1,272.67 
DIAGNOSTIC 
RADIOLOGY $1,006,184 $22,362 $938,376 $368,455.61 $386,678.89 $346,093.88 $364,317.16 
GENETICS $25,462 $2,572 $21,342 $10,590.54 $11,616.43 $8,018.90 $9,044.79 
INTERNAL 
MEDICINE $1,632,775 $43,715 $1,484,885 $540,193.61 $576,891.23 $496,478.40 $533,176.02 
LABORATORY 
MEDICINE $38,514 $669 $36,451 $11,932.11 $13,051.85 $11,262.82 $12,382.56 
NEUROLOGY $105,654 $2,178 $99,360 $40,257.39 $44,608.75 $38,079.02 $42,430.38 
NEURO-
SURGERY $156,664 $33,028 $118,128 $45,296.93 $50,908.40 $12,269.29 $17,880.76 
OB/GYN $276,086 $37,470 $197,421 $117,735.05 $129,397.28 $80,265.02 $91,927.25 
OPHTHAL-
MOLOGY $219,222 $16,352 $189,786 $74,385.52 $85,241.00 $58,033.29 $68,888.77 
ORTHO-
PAEDICS $344,149 $9,107 $317,679 $120,615.85 $129,138.15 $111,509.12 $120,031.42 
PATHOLOGY $287,494 $19,746 $247,064 $142,116.08 $148,513.95 $122,370.55 $128,768.42 
PEDIATRICS $150,290 $15,990 $123,720 $53,146.57 $73,011.06 $37,156.99 $57,021.48 
PSYCHIATRY $124,690 $28,018 $70,545 $37,624.35 $45,807.60 $9,606.79 $17,790.04 
SURGERY $1,523,932 $75,468 $1,326,546 $518,910.27 $578,709.56 $443,441.86 $503,241.15 
SURGERY 
EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE $1,526,292 $15,321 $1,464,778 $589,558.60 $727,784.62 $574,237.88 $712,463.90 
THERAPEUTIC 
RADIOLOGY $316,728 $8,117 $276,833 $118,292.91 $122,289.47 $110,176.14 $114,172.70 
YALE CANCER 
CENTER $172,640 $11,709 $145,839 $93,918.98 $98,333.65 $82,210.29 $86,624.96 
Totals $9,376,980 $502,357 $8,310,236 $3,635,387 $4,005,876 $3,133,030 $3,503,519 
 
Free Care Financial Categories include: 
-FINANCIAL HARDSHIP DISCOUNT 
-FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES 
-MAMO CHARITY DISCOUNT 
-PHYSICIAN DETERMINED FINANCIAL HARDSHIP 
-YDR CHARITY WRITEOFF 
-PROFESSIONAL COURTESY DISCOUNT 
-ANESTHESIA/SURG RESIDENT COSMETIC DISCOUNT  
-INTL SVC FREE CARE DISCOUNT  
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Table 5: Fiscal Year 2008 Total Uncompensated Care as a % of total payments per 
department 









ANESTHESIOLOGY $665,153.87 $835,904.65 2.16 2.71 
CHILD STUDY CENTER $43,364.24 $43,113.84 1.41 1.40 
DERMATOLOGY $234,821.88 $238,455.53 1.17 1.19 
DERMATOPATHOLOGY LAB $7,527.60 $7,501.96 1.26 1.26 
DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY $668,663.46 $728,961.85 4.20 4.58 
GENETICS $20,096.35 $31,293.78 0.78 1.21 
INTERNAL MEDICINE $774,112.56 $898,493.57 2.91 3.38 
LABORATORY MEDICINE $24,726.36 $28,779.70 3.06 3.56 
NEUROLOGY $67,233.51 $82,258.19 2.57 3.14 
NEUROSURGERY $29,739.26 $53,794.53 0.61 1.10 
OB/GYN $281,974.54 $361,241.91 1.35 1.73 
OPHTHALMOLOGY $91,393.70 $134,480.44 1.92 2.83 
ORTHOPAEDICS $192,160.74 $227,254.35 1.97 2.33 
PATHOLOGY $448,536.39 $491,829.29 1.91 2.10 
PEDIATRICS $101,879.58 $329,178.81 0.57 1.85 
PSYCHIATRY $53,925.63 $80,441.94 7.07 10.54 
SURGERY $675,758.14 $847,994.25 2.37 2.97 
SURGERY EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE $1,471,359.49 $1,895,086.10 15.29 19.70 
THERAPEUTIC RADIOLOGY $160,282.50 $169,491.52 2.11 2.23 
YALE CANCER CENTER $163,541.27 $180,039.91 3.09 3.40 
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Discussion: 
Based on a large literature search, no values for uncompensated care have previously 
been generated using an opportunity cost model to value physician time at a single institution.  
Although Gruber et al. provided the analysis of a larger group of physicians, the large spectrum 
of practice settings and their various administration models and incentives structures creates 
some difficulty in pinpointing the source of uncompensated care and makes it somewhat more 
complex to track over time. Using their approach, one could imagine a situation in which some 
physicians (perhaps in AMCs) would provide ever more uncompensated care while, at the same 
time, physicians in other locations would “counteract” these values with more profitable 
enterprises. In such a situation, charity care by certain physicians would be masked by profits 
generated by their colleagues. 
The benefit of using a single AMC with a centralized governing model is the potential to 
link changes in administrative incentives with changes in uncompensated care outcomes. 
Presumably, an AMC such as Yale, based on the historic charitable mission and proximity to 
disadvantaged patients and large clinical infrastructure, can exert a large influence over the 
uncompensated care dynamics in its community. Any change in the provision of such care at 
such an institution would have many ramifications. Thus, the appropriate valuing of such care is 
a requisite first step. 
 
Write-offs 
The use of write-offs (included in the first 3 tables of the results) highlights an important 
issue in valuing charitable care.  Inherent in the accounting of write offs is the difference 
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between the charges generated for a patient and the actual payments made by that patient. 
However, as stated earlier, this difference reflects a largely inflated value generated by the 
inflated non-negotiated charges charged to self-pay patients. Since the inflated prices are 
generated from negotiated rates and not from market forces, these prices represent a slightly 
skewed “value”. An example from Table 2 will help clarify this. In 2008, the Anesthesiology 
department generated   $2,812,016 in charges and $1,025,264 in write offs. However, using the 
opportunity cost model described in the methods section, the value of uncompensated care was 
$369,622. This represents a significant difference.  
  
Comparison of values 
Using the opportunity cost approach, the total value of Uncompensated Care provided 
by physicians in Fiscal Year 2008 as part of the Yale Medical Group was $6,510,373.65. This 
represents 2.75% of the total payments made for the same year. This percentage can be 
compared to other estimates of the provision of such care.  
Comparison to write-offs 
The total “Write-offs” for FY2008 (Bad debt and Free Care total write-offs) was 
$18,165,589 whereas the calculated total “Uncompensated care” was $6,510,373.65. The total 
in terms of percentage would be 7.67% of total payments vs. 2.75%. Again, these estimates 
reflect the different “valuing” of physician time.  
Comparison to earlier published estimates 
Because estimates of physician-provided care are sparse, values from previous studies 
are not current and cannot be directly compared to the values generated in this study. However, 
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they can provide a sense of the effects of different accounting mechanisms and the evolution in 
levels of care provided. In 1978, Sloan et al., using a 1977 nationwide survey of physicians, “ 
found that charity care amounted to 2.7% of gross billings and that bad debts accounted for an 
additional 8.4% of gross billings”15 with a total of more than 11% of billings. In 1985, Ohsfeldt 
used the AMA’s “Socioeconomic Monitoring System from 1982 found that physicians donated 
9% of billings to charity care and 6.3% to bad debt with a total of 15.3% of billings. In 1991, 
Kilpatrick et al. found that 10.4 % of billed amounts of a random sample of physicians from 
Florida were unresolved (and hence, constituted a combination of bad debt and charity care). All 
of these previous studies used billed charges and hence generated values many times higher 
than the calculated amounts in this study.  However, as stated earlier, it must be kept in mind 
that the billed amounts do not represent “real” market value. 
 
 
Comparison to analysis by Gruber et al in “How much uncompensated care do 
doctors provide?” 
In their analysis of uncompensated care provided by physicians, Gruber determined that 
even in their most generous estimates, physicians provided no more than 0.8% of 
uncompensated care and that they were most likely providing no overall uncompensated care 
whatsoever. They did, however, describe a system in which uncompensated care was unevenly 
distributed. Based on the findings generated in this study, physicians at Academic Medical 
Centers such as Yale would constitute a distinct subpopulation that would fall on the right upper 
hand side of the graph describing the distribution of uncompensated care (starred on following 
graph).  
 




Assuming that both the current study and the Gruber study accurately represent reality, 
the combined interpretation of these results would suggest that academic physicians as a whole 
at Yale are more “generous” than most physicians (~ 65% of all physicians) but that many more 
physicians (~35%) in different settings are providing higher levels of uncompensated care.  
 
 
Breakdown per department 
Of course, physicians at Yale practice under different clinical circumstances and treat a 
different patient payer mix.   As could be predicted, different departments at Yale provide 
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different levels of uncompensated care and this is reflected in the result in Table 1. In FY2008, 
these values ranged from 0.57% (in Pediatrics) to 15.29% (in Emergency Surgery).   
The striking difference in levels of uncompensated care in different departments can, to 
some extent, be explained by certain obligations and government support. For example, the 
department offering the lowest calculated amount of uncompensated care, Pediatrics, treats a 
population that is largely covered by Connecticut Husky Healthcare (the CT SCHIP program). The 
department offering the highest level of uncompensated care, Emergency Surgery, is required 
by the EMTALA laws of 1986 to stabilize patients regardless of insurance status and effectively 
“donates” very costly surgical interventions often without being reimbursed.   
Of specific interest are the departments that fall in between these two predictable 
extremes. For example, the department of Neurosurgery provided $29,739,260 of 
uncompensated care or 0.61% of total payments ($4,903,132) for the year 2008 while the 
department of Neurology provided $67,233.51 or 2.57% of total payments ($2,619,401).  This 
400% difference in rates would suggest that the department of Neurosurgery either passively  
benefits from a better payer mix or that it actively limits donations of free services or that it 
exerts more effective billing collection strategies, (or a combination of these factors).  
At any rate, the differences in departmental uncompensated care values highlighted by 
this approach would not otherwise have been so apparent. In fact, if one were to look simply at 
write-offs, the Neurology and Neurosurgery departments would look much more similar. Under 
total write-offs for 2008, Neurology donated $188,989 (7.2% of payments) whereas 
Neurosurgery donated $241,014 (5.0% of payments) for a much smaller interdepartmental 
difference of 144%.      
Thus, simply being aware of these calculated values opens up a series of questions 
regarding departmental policies and priorities regarding the care of the medically indigent. 
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Although it may be possible that no individual physician purposefully or actively limits the care 
of the indigent, the marked differences in values for certain departments in Table4 does call into 
question departmental incentive structures that may, in reality, be influencing outcomes in an 
indirect fashion. As one example illustrates, policies aimed at shortening delays for insured 
patients would effectively curtail uncompensated care in an environment where clinics are 
already near full capacity.  
Simply being aware of these values is important as any departmental policy change has 
the potential to affect uncompensated care. Knowledge of current values could serve as a 
means of setting baseline statistics and determining eventual departmental targets.   
 
Medicaid Adjustments 
 Included in the result tables are the adjustments to the uncompensated care values 
generated by subtracting the charges and payments made on the behalf of patients covered by 
Medicaid. Since Medicaid pays on average less than Medicare and private insurance and since 
many physicians in the community at large are able to refuse Medicaid patients, payments 
made under this government insurance plan decreased the average opportunity cost and in 
effects lowers the amount of uncompensated care calculated with this model. These results 
demonstrate the expected results: removing Medicaid patients from the average increases the 
amount of uncompensated care provided. Overall, this represents an increase from 2.75% of 
total payments to 3.32% of total payments. However, since no academic medical center could 
realistically replace all its Medicaid patients with other insured patients, the true calculated 
value lies somewhere between these two extremes.   
 
P a g e  | 40 
 
Weaknesses of this approach 
 Implicit in the use of opportunity cost models is the notion of a substitution of a 
medically indigent patient for an insured patients and hence the assumption that physicians are 
always fully occupied. This is certainly not always the case and thus the values generated in this 
study cannot accurately or fully represent the reality of uncompensated care.  In fact, one would 
assume that a physician providing free services is not always fully occupied and that the true 
value of his/her time is somewhat smaller than the values generated here. Hence, the 
opportunity cost model and its results probably represents an overestimate of the true value.  
 Also, this model assumes that physician activities are completely accounted for 
in billing data. If physicians donate time that isn’t represented in the financial database 
(certainly the case to some extent), it will not be represented and could lead to an 
underestimate of the true value. 
  
Future directions  
  The calculated value of physician-derived uncompensated care for fiscal 
year 2008 using this approach sets a baseline for future comparisons at the Yale Medical Group.  
Subsequent or previous years can then be analyzed and compared.  Given the importance of an 
academic medical center such as Yale to the provision of such care, it is important to monitor 
these activities using a model that reflects the most accurate values possible.  Future modeling 
would have to take into account several possible confounders.  It is possible for instance, that 
future adult patients might benefit from new government-sponsored programs. In such a 
situation, calculated uncompensated care would be presumed to fall without affecting the 
provision of care to the larger community. Thus, any changes in patient insurance levels would 
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have to be controlled for over time. Also, as average physician reimbursements for each billable 
charge changes over time, so does the calculated opportunity cost. For instance, if a billed 
charge frequently used by the uninsured is reimbursed at a much lower rate in a subsequent 
year, calculated uncompensated care would fall without there being a true change in physician 
activity (or much change in physician payments). Thus, it would be necessary to monitor 
changes in reimbursement rates at the CPT code level (taking into account the weighted 
contribution of each CPT code to bad debt and free care categories) and compare these to the 
changes in uncompensated care.  If the changes in CPT reimbursement mirror the changes in 
uncompensated care, then one could assume that no change in provision has actually taken 
place.    
 
Since the Yale Medical Group represents only a subset of the larger issue, this approach 
could also be replicated in various other settings, other academic medical centers and private 
practice groups. Extending this calculation using primary financial data would constitute a more 
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